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The Politics Of The Perverse
[Review of Brenda Cossman, Shannon Bell, Lise Gotell, & Becki L.
Ross, Bad Attitude/s On Trial: Pornography, Feminism, and the Butler
Decision (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997)]
Bad Attitude/s on Trial presents a "critical analysis of pornography in the
context of contemporary Canada,"' with a particular focus on the impact
of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Butler,2 and its
reformulation of the basis of obscenity law. The book is co-written by
four Canadian academics: Brenda Cossman, Shannon Bell, Lise Gotell,
and Becki L. Ross. Each has contributed a separate section of the book,
along with an introduction by Cossman and Bell. The result is a vital,
theoretically sophisticated addition to the literature on pornography; a
vivid documentation of the impact of obscenity law on the lives of
lesbians, gay men, and others in Canada; and a scathing and powerful
indictment of the complicity of anti-pornography feminists in the main-
tenance of the heteronormative moral order.
The introduction presents a historical review of the regulation of
sexual images in Canada, underscoring the ways in which current
developments are continuous with moral discourses of the past. Lise
Gotell then looks at the role of the Women's Legal Education and Action
Fund (LEAF) in shaping the Supreme Court's discourse in Butler. Brenda
Cossman focuses specifically on that discourse, and attempts to deconstruct
Sopinka J.'s judgment to reveal its underlying sexual conservatism.
Becki Ross then interrogates one of the cases which followed the Butler
decision, R. v. Scythes,3 from her vantage point as an expert witness for
the defendant. Finally, Shannon Bell examines Canada's so-called child
pornography law and the construction of a child porn panic, using
interview-based research with alleged "child pornographers" in order to
develop a philosophical argument grounded in an ethics of care.
* Professor of Law and Social Theory, University of Reading, United Kingdom.
1. B. Cossman, S. Bell, L. Gotell, & B.L. Ross, Bad Attitude/s on Trial: Pornography,
Feminism, and the Butler Decision (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 3.
2. (1992),89 D.L.R. (4th) 449 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Butler]. The majority judgment delivered
by Sopinka J. forms the basis of the analysis in the book, and in this review. A separate
concurring judgment was written by Gonthier J.
3. (16 January 1993), Toronto (Ont. Ct. Prov. Div.) [unreported] [hereinafter Bad Attitude
trial].
Carl F. Stychin*
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In this review, I begin with a brief review of the Butler decision, before
considering the main arguments of the book. I then move on to examine
the implications of Bad Attitude/s on Trial for what I will call a politics
of perversion.
Setting The Stage: Butler
In February, 1992 the Supreme Court of Canada in Butler unanimously
upheld the obscenity provisions of the Criminal Code as a constitution-
ally valid limitation of the right of free expression. Historically, the courts
have interpreted obscenity law by focusing on whether the exploitation
of sex in the work is "undue." The test for determining the undue
exploitation of sex is the community standard of tolerance test-what
Canadians would not tolerate other Canadians viewing. Furthermore, the
community standard is national in scope and not, for example, that of a
subculture, or a particular municipal or provincial community.
Of particular interest is the fact that the Supreme Court seemed to
accept many of the arguments that were raised by counsel advocating the
feminist anti-pornography position, which was grafted on the undue
exploitation of sex standard. That position was advanced by LEAF, one
of the intervenors in the case. The issue of undueness thus began to shift
in the judgment of Sopinka J., writing for the majority, away from notions
of morality and the preservation of the moral fibre of society, and towards
human degradation as a justification for regulation. He recognized that
material which may be said to exploit sex in a "degrading or dehuman-
izing manner" would necessarily fail the community standards test, "not
because it offends against morals but because it is perceived by public
opinion to be harmful to society, particularly women."4 The justification
for regulation appeared to be harm. The Court found that harm includes
predisposing persons to act in an anti-social manner-a manner which
society formally recognizes as incompatible with its proper functioning.'
Sopinka J. expanded upon the relationship between representation and
harm through a threefold categorization of pornography. He held that:
(l)the portrayal of sex coupled with violence will almost always consti-
tute the undue exploitation of sex; (2) explicit sex which is degrading or
dehumanizing may be undue if the risk of harm is substantial; (3) explicit
sex that is not violent and neither degrading nor dehumanizing is
generally tolerated in our society and will not qualify as the undue
4. Supra note 2 at 467 [emphasis added].
5. Ibid. at 470.
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exploitation of sex unless it employs children in its production. 6 The
infringement on the constitutional right of freedom of expression thus is
justifiable under the reasonable limits test because the focus is not on
moral disapproval but the avoidance of harm to society, which is a
pressing and substantial concern. A series of linkages, therefore, implic-
itly is found between exploitation, degradation, a process of moral
desensitization, and social harm. Those assumptions have come to be
central to the discourse which has surrounded the regulation of pornog-
raphy in the post-Butler era, and a skepticism about the simplistic
connection between representation and reality, and about the possibility
of literal readings of representations, informs the argument in Bad
Attitude/s on Trial.
Central Themes
The central thesis of the book is that while sexual explicitness is not the
official basis for state censorship under the Butler test for social harm, the
impact of Butler has been increased criminal regulation of some types of
sexual imagery, namely, "any representations that hint at alternative
sexualities:"7 lesbian and gay; sadomasochistic; or the sexual represen-
tation of youth. One of the primary effects of Butler has been to provide
a cloak of legitimacy for state censorship. Moreover, the Supreme
Court's decision is legitimized by its appropriation of feminist anti-
pornography discourse, which has been presented "as the singular and
universal feminist voice."8 The authors attempt to problematize that
standpoint, highlighting "the complicity of feminist constituencies in the
discourse of moral conservatives,"' and showing how that discourse has
been felt by lesbians and gay men.
Moral conservatism is the primary trope in the history of obscenity law
in Canada, and the authors argue that current developments are continu-
ous with the past. The Victorian discourse of sexuality as a dangerous
force in need of control was repeated in the climate of 1950s suburban
Canada, as pornography, along with prostitution and homosexuality, was
set against family values. The 1950s also saw the development of the
"undue exploitation of sex" test for obscenity, and the judicial recogni-
tion of a national community standard through which "undue exploita-
tion" would be determined.
6. Ibid. at 471.
7. Supra note I at 4.
8. Ibid. at 7.
9. Ibid. at 8.
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Beginning in the 1970s, a feminist anti-pornography discourse sought
to articulate harm towards women as the justification for the legal
regulation of pornography, as a means of replacing sexual immorality as
the basis for censorship. However, another central theme of BadAttitude/s
on Trial is that a "discursive blending" 0 has occurred, in which feminist
anti-pornography discourse has been mixed with conservative, and reli-
gious fundamentalist tropes. That discursive blending is apparent within
the Butler decision, and its aftermath is evidenced by the actions of
customs officials, lower court judges, and the police. As Cossman and
Bell argue, "the underlying concerns of contemporary campaigns are all
too consistent with the anti-pornography campaigns of the past"."
In contrast to anti-pornography feminists, the authors of BadAttitude/s
on Trial locate their work within the framework of postmodern feminism,
and their focus is on the construction of knowledge, power, and dis-
courses of sexuality2 Pornography, like sexuality, proves to be a "site of
ambiguity,"1" of pleasure as well as danger. The meaning of porn, like any
representation, "is historically and contextually specific and contin-
gent." 4 The authors reject the claim, explicit within anti-porn discourse,
that "the representation is a literal and objective depiction of the under-
lying sexual act."'5
Becki Ross develops this argument, deploying the example of lesbian
sadomasochism (s/m), which she argues cannot be subjected to a literal-
ist, objective, neutral reading. As she explains, s/m intended for a lesbian
reader/viewer, rather than being demeaning and degrading, "exposes the
naturalized status of femininity (and masculinity) in ways that disrupt the
power of heterosexualizing law;" "opens up spaces between the norms
that regulate gender and sexuality;" and "send[s] up or satirize[s] conven-
tional sexual and gender stereotypes.' 6 By contrast, "lezzie spreads in
mainstream porn"'17 always carry the message that the "male reader is
invited to enter and master the scene."' 8
10. Ibid. at 67.
11. Ibid.at2l.
12. On postmodem feminist theory, see generally C. Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law
(London: Routledge, 1995); C. Smart, Law, Crime and Sexuality (London: Sage, 1995); MJ.
Frug, Postmodern Legal Feminism (New York: Routledge, 1992).
13. Supra note 1 at 22.
14. Ibid. at 25.
15. Ibid. at44.
16. Ibid. at 159.
17. Ibid. at 166.
18. Ibid. at 167.
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Not only is porn a site of contradiction and complexity, but legal
discourse is itself a "complex and contradictory site of engagement" for
feminists.' 9 Thus, state censorship of porn serves to "inhibit women's
sexual agency and power," at the same time that it demonizes "new sexual
villains" and subjects them to intensified legal scrutiny.'0
In her analysis of LEAF's intervention in Butler, Lise Gotell critiques
LEAF's claim that it "sought to disrupt the dominant moral-conservative
underpinnings of obscenity regulation in favour of an approach empha-
sizing sexual equality and the 'harmful' effects of pornography for
women.""1 Gotell shows how this division between harm and morality is
false. LEAF, along with other anti-pornography feminists, has con-
structed its claims on the moral high ground, "constituting its own claims
about sexual representation as 'true,' as 'good,' and as the expression of
the best interests of the 'disempowered.' "22 LEAF's factum in Butler,
Gotell convincingly demonstrates, is remarkably similar to the argu-
ments made by the various attorneys-general, and even those of religious
conservatives. Central to all of the anti-porn discourses is the construc-
tion of sexuality as dangerous and threatening to the social structure. In
this way, all anti-porn discourses make foundational claims to cer-
tainty - to "Truth" - which come to be embraced particularly fervently
in times of rapid change, and economic and social anxiety. This construc-
tion is consistent with broader currents in Western thought, in which
sexuality is viewed as "an explosive libidinal force."23 Such foundational
claims to Truth are privileged within legal discourse because of law's
own claim to speak an objective Truth. As a consequence, there is a
"strategic compatibility of feminist foundationalism and law ,"24 which
was manifested in the Supreme Court's reasoning in Butler. The under-
lying assumption in anti-porn discourse is that "the depiction of sexual
practices that lie outside of majoritarian norms constitutes a threat to the
community. 25 In this way, "moral concerns about decency, immorality,
abnormal sex, and family decline" can be discursively blended with
"newer concerns about sexual violence, the degradation of women, and
gender harm. '26 Law is a force for certainty and objectivity in a time of
instability, in which sexuality threatens to go out of control.
19. Ibid. at 29.
20. Ibid. at 31.
21. Ibid. at 49.
22. Ibid. at 51.
23. Ibid. at 57.
24. Ibid. at 52.
25. Ibid. at 84.
26. Ibid. at 86.
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Gotell contextualizes the currrent hegemony of anti-porn discourse in
terms of a number of social and political developments. The interpreta-
tion of the "sexual revolution" as a cause of social decline, dominant
constructions of HIV/AIDS, and the post-Keynesian economic dis-
courses of restraint, constraint, and caution, all help to explain why anti-
porn discourse has proven so successful in its current guise.27 It has served
to "produce a panic around pornography that renders the expression of
sexual power, pleasure, and agency increasingly unintelligible." 8 An-
other key factor is the climate of backlash against feminism. It is ironic
that anti-porn feminism achieved a hegemonic position in such a climate,
but this can be explained by the desire for the recreation of unity within
the feminist movement. Moreover, the appropriation of feminist anti-
porn discourse by conservatives has provided a means for the right wing
to modernize its rhetoric, while still connecting to a law-and-order
agenda, in which "criminalization becomes a preferred policy response
to social anxiety" (another dominant discourse in the 1990s).9
Because of all of these factors, opponents of Butler are placed in a
defensive, marginalized position. In large part, this is because anti-
censorship claims, to the extent that they avoid a straightforward liberal,
civil libertarian position, are left with a discourse which emphasizes
contingency, hypotheticals, and the contradictions which are inherent in
representation.3° Furthermore, as Gotell shows, anti-censorship dis-
course "is necessarily forced into questioning law's own image of itself
as 'objective' ".3, That is, central to the argument is the way in which the
administration of obscenity law is necessarily "subjective, arbitrary, or
discriminatory."32 By contrast, LEAF's claims are presented as "unified,
authoritative, and universal," a standpoint which is privileged within
legal discourse.33 Anti-censorship arguments are trivialized, in part
because "the assertion that pornography has no essence, no 'Truth' to be
discerned by the judiciary, represented a firm denial of law's power"-
of its claim to be able to discern the Truth of a representation .4 Anti-por
discourses (of all varieties) make the claim that the Truth of a represen-
tation is apparent on its face, and can be determined by the judiciary "as
27. Ibid. at 57.
28. Ibid. at 60.
29. Ibid. at 69.
30. Ibid. at 72-73.
31. Ibid. at 73.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid. at 79.
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if it were a purely formulaic exercise."35 Underlying such an argument is
the claim that "law is a sphere of logic and rationality, divorced from
politics and bias" and, in this way, legal objectivity is reified.36 It is no
wonder that these arguments are privileged within legal discourse.
Gotell's analysis is given a concrete reality in Becki Ross's explora-
tion of the BadAttitude trial, from her perspective as expert witness .3 She
contrasts her treatment by Paris J. and Crown counsel, with the way in
which the expert witness for the Crown, American psychologist Neil
Malamuth (the darling of anti-porn feminists) was constructed.38 Ross's
experience confirms Gotell's claim that foundational truths are privi-
leged within legal discourse. While Malamuth was perceived as an
objective, value-free scientist who made definitive judgments about
lesbian s/m, Ross was constructed as biased, subjective, and value-laden
when she attempted "to explicate and contextualize the specificities,
nuances, and complexities of lesbian s/in fantasy, alongside the
sociopolitical meanings it engenders within lesbian s/m culture."3 9
Gotell's interrogation of LEAF's factum reveals how its argument is
consistent with other anti-porn discourses. It relies upon a belief in the
potential objectivity of law; draws upon discourses of sexual danger and
on a negative view of sexual expression; constructs women as passive
"victims"; and locates its own position on the moral high ground of
authoritative Truth.'W In this way, LEAF "marginalizes other feminist
voices who speak from outside the boundaries of legal discourse,"'" for
it "advances an absolute and definitive conception of pornography as the
very embodiment of gendered harm." 42 Any challenges to LEAF's claim
to Truth are met by the retort that one is "denying the realities of those less
privileged women for whom LEAF claims to speak."43 In this way, the
Butler factum becomes "unassailable, placed above the push and pull of
35. Ibid. at 83.
36. Ibid.
37. Bad Attitude, a lesbian sex magazine, was seized by police from Toronto's Glad Day
Bookshop two months after the Butler decision. The owner of Glad Day, John Scythes, was
convicted of possession and sale of obscene material, contrary to s. 163 of the Criminal Code,
after a five day trial. Engaging in an academic analysis of the dynamics of a criminal trial, after
having participated in it as an expert witness, might well strike some as difficult and
problematic. It certainly raises methodological issues which the author might well have
addressed more explicitly.
38. Supra note 1 at 157-158.
39. Ibid. at 153.
40. Ibid. at 87.
41. Ibid. at 88.
42. Ibid. at 90.
43. Ibid. at 93.
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feminist contestation," because it is True. 44 Moreover, the (naive) as-
sumption is that "feminists can insert their concerns into law and law
itself would be recast in this process."4
Brenda Cossman picks up the story with a deconstructive reading of
the text of the Butler decision. She argues that Butler represents a change
in obscenity law at the level of language alone. The discourse of harm to
women is a form of "sexual morality in drag," for an underlying moral
conservatism informs the judgment.46 Thus, contrary to the claims of anti-
porn feminists, the targeting of lesbian and gay representations in the
wake of Butler is not a misreading of the judgment, but an accurate
implementation of its underlying message. Embedded in the reasons of
Sopinka J., Cossman argues, are a series of distinctions which are central
to Western thought: mind/body, intellectual/physical, emotional/sen-
sual. For the Supreme Court, "bad sex" (the representation of which is
censorable pornography) constitutes undue exploitation. It is sex which
places its subjects "in positions of subordination, servile submission or
humiliation.147 Good sex, the representation of which is not porno-
graphic, is "sex with more": sex which transcends the physical, the body,
the sensual.48 "Art" is not "pornography", for art "appeals to more than
our physical nature" .4' The art/porn distinction thus is firmly entrenched.
This point would later be confirmed in the Bad Attitude trial, when
counsel's attempts to introduce evidence of changing community stan-
dards were rejected by the Court. Madonna's Sex, for example, was not
taken as representative of the mainstream acceptance of s/m. Rather, its
"embeddedness in the legitimizing discourses of high art and fashion
photography"5 ensured that it could be distinguished, for art isn't porn,
and porn certainly isn't art. So too, magazines such as Vogue, which also
toy with s/m imagery, are irrelevant, for fashion discourse isn't porn
either. In a remarkable passage, Paris J. apparently stated that Vogue "was
afashion magazine, one his daughters read at home."5" The heterosexual
presumptions are clear.
44. Ibid. at 99.
45. Ibid. at 97.
46. Ibid. at 108.
47. Ibid. at 111.
48. Ibid. at 112.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid. at 171.
51. Ibid. at 169.
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Cossman forcefully argues that the construction of a line between good
and bad sex is based on "an underlying conservative sexual morality," in
which community standards, which presume an essential and monolithic
shared sexual morality, govern.52 Thus, as Sopinka J. recognized in
Butler, what has altered is simply the community's understanding of
porn's harms and, one might add, of good and bad sex. Good sex, and
good representations, are those which affirm women's agency through an
appeal to the intellectual rather than the base. Cossman concludes that
within Butler, sex "is bad unless it can be made good by transcending its
corporeal nature."53 As a consequence, sex is located firmly outside the
political process, and on the periphery of the values which underpin the
freedom of expression guarantee in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
The basis of legal regulation -community standards -reinforces this
construction, for "community standards only make sense in relation to a
prevailing, and generally accepted, understanding of sexual morality, in
which some sex is good and some sex is not. 54
Compelling evidence for Cossman's deconstructive reading can be
found in subsequent case law interpreting Butler, in which the distinction
between morality and harm collapses. In Glad Day Books v. Canada, gay
male sex becomes per se degrading and dehumanizing, and therefore
obscene .5 5 Equally blatant is the reasoning in the Bad Attitude trial. In his
judgment, Paris J. ruled that the description of a lesbian s/m fantasy is
degrading (and therefore obscene), despite the explicit presence of
consent, through the technique of "heteroswitching." That is, because the
test for community standards is supposedly neutral to sexual orientation,
Paris J. substituted a man for the lesbian "top" (rather than the "bottom,"
of course). Had this been a heterosexual representation, he then reasoned,
it would have been obscene. Thus, the standard is explicitly grounded in
heterosexual assumptions, and the specificity of lesbian s/m cultural
practices, as is so often the case, can be erased completely.
Becki Ross paints a vivid and disturbing picture of her treatment at the
hands of Paris J. and Crown counsel in the Bad Attitude trial. I was left
in complete agreement with her conclusion: "when I string these occa-
sions of punishment and humiliation together, I find ineluctable, ironic
confirmation of the trial itself as ritualized s/m theatre."56 Ross's experi-
52. Ibid. at 116.
53. Ibid. at 123.
54. Ibid. at 127.
55. (14 July 1992), Toronto (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) [unreported].
56. Supra note 1 at 174.
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ence confirms Cossman's analysis of Butler down to the ground. Women
are constructed as objects in need of the protection offered by the law.
Judicial attitudes underscore how the representation of lesbianism threat-
ens "their sense of masculine prowess in part through obstructing their
ability to enter and control the pornographic scene. Indeed, portrayals of
sexually self-sufficient lesbians may shake heterosexual men's sense of
entitlement to power over women in general."57
But Ross also demonstrates that while legal discourse may be power-
ful, it is not all powerful. Resistance occurs at several sites, and the irony
of the current climate of censorship is that it fuels queer cultural workers
to resist the dominant discourses through a new spate of queer culture,
which problematizes the art/sex, high/low dichotomies. Another irony in
attempts by the state to censor lesbian and gay imagery is that the act of
censorship can serve to bring representations into broader, public culture.
While this may seem small comfort, the growth of queer culture under-
scores that hegemonies are never without points of weakness and resis-
tance.
Shannon Bell's contribution focuses on a closely related issue: Canada's
so-called "child porn laws." She demonstrates how "youth" and "child"
come to be completely collapsed in a law which makes illegal the
representation of sex with someone under eighteen years, despite the fact
that the age of consent is fourteen. 8 So too, the exchange of money in
Canada now makes an otherwise legal sex act with a youth illegal.5 9
Bell uses the events surrounding the construction of a child porn panic
in London, Ontario, and an interview with street hustler and pornmaker
Matthew McGowan (who was unsuccessfully prosecuted under the law),
to underscore hypocrisy. She finds that the laws primarily target gay
street youth, whose experiences making pom are firmly discounted by
discourses of expertise, which insist on a narrative of coercion and
victimization. 60 The question of why so many queer kids end up on the
streets seems never to be asked within these discourses, thereby demon-
strating "the straight mind's insistence that youth are directly harmed by
the sexual involvement itself rather than by the social and cultural
contextualization of this sexual involvement.
' 6 1
Listening to the voices of gay street youth, s/m'ers, queer pornmakers,
and others, is central to Bell's philosophical position. She advocates an
ethics centred on "radical democracy," which involves "the activity of
57. Ibid. at 180.
58. Ibid. at 202.
59. Ibid. at 216.
60. Ibid. at 209-211.
61. Ibid. at 230.
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listening, listening to all, all the way. Radical democracy is listening to
all others and all parts of the self."62 This position is grounded both in
Foucauldian theory, and postmodernism more generally, in its ethical
rejection of grand narratives. Indeed, this is the core of the ethical position
of all the authors: that feminist anti-porn discourse has become a grand
narrative which has silenced, demeaned, and trivialized other experi-
ences and interpretations of sex and sexual representation, particularly
those emanating from marginalized sexual communities. The-injustice of
that discourse flows from Bell's precept that "a society is just if no one
game dominates the other games and becomes a grand narrative."63
Displacing the grand narrative of anti-porn feminism is the task which the
authors set for themselves.
Perverting Politics
Bad Attitude/s on Trial makes for compelling reading. Bringing four
writers together to create a coherent whole is no easy task, and the authors
have blended their different interests and disciplines admirably. Impor-
tantly, the style reflects their queer sensibility in relation to academic
discourse. While the book is clearly a major contribution to political and
legal theory, it also seeks to problematize the binary of academia and
queer political activism. Thus, although the authors illuminate the serious
issues raised by the censorship of queer images, they also manage to queer
the genre of academic writing through the techniques of irreverence,
humour, and camp. They "send up" the straight world at the same time
that they participate within its discourse. For example, in contrasting the
censorship of Bad Attitude to how Madonna's Sex entered Canada, Ross
notes that "the safe passage of Sex across the U.S./Canada border was
eased by the twin lubricants of money and power; the publishers of Bad
Attitude had no such 'luck' ."' While this style may cause discomfort to
some readers, in the same way that the use of the term "queer" to describe
an academic discourse often does, that is part of the exercise. With time,
those readers may find that their discomfort lessens, without the need for
intellectual lubrication.
On a more substantive level, the authors faced a conundrum. Their
contention is that pornography is a site of contradiction, and that any
narrative which seeks to explain the Truth of a representation inevitably
62. Ibid. at 213.
63. Ibid. at 214.
64. Ibid. at 171.
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will be inadequate and partial. The critique of anti-pornography feminism
lies in the way in which its claims to foundational Truth (which are
privileged within Truth seeking legal discourse) have erased the diverse
meanings and responses to pornography, especially those generated
within alternative sexual communities. Moreover, those communities are
demonized through the underlying sexual morality of Canadian obscen-
ity law, as filtered through anti-porn feminism. However, it is difficult,
as the authors acknowledge, to write and speak from the standpoint of
contradiction, partiality, and nuance, especially within academic dis-
course, which, like law, generally privileges those with a claim to
universal Truth. In other words, how do you answer one grand narrative
without building up another? It is all too easy to respond to the claim that
all porn is bad with the argument that all porn is good. At some points in
Bad Attitude/s on Trial, this slippage begins to occur, although the
authors claim to be skeptical of the possibility of there being a Grand
Truth for any representation. 6' However, given the hegemonic position
which anti-pornography feminism has occupied in the last several years,
it seems to me that this rhetorical move-a form of strategic essential-
ism-is justifiable politically. 66 In her chapter, Lise Gotell calls for a
reinvention within feminism of "an appreciation of debate, of wars of
position, of respectful conversation and heated argument." 67 While anti-
porn feminism clearly has silenced many voices, it is important that anti-
censorship discourse avoids the same pitfalls if it is to cultivate respectful
conversations between fair-minded people who agree to differ.
This brings me to a broader issue, namely, the political and theoretical
agenda advocated in Bad Attitude/s on Trial. There are several elements
to this agenda. Cossman and Bell suggest that our focus should shift away
from criminalization and towards working practices and labour standards
for those engaged in the production of pornography, and for other sex
65. The possibility of constructing a regulatory regime based on the content of any represen-
tation thus must be open to question. This point is one which the authors try to avoid addressing
explicitly, but which needs to be confronted by those skeptical both of the existence of a
singular, literal Truth to representation, and of the ability of the state to interpret and regulate
visual representations in a multicultural and pluralistic society.
66. I do not claim the high ground in this regard, for some of my own work engages in
precisely this form of argument with respect to gay male porn. See C.F. Stychin, Law's Desire:
Sexuality and the Limits of Justice (London: Routledge, 1995) 55-90. Moreover, having been
the subject of quite personalized attack within feminist anti-porn discourse (a non-consensual
form of s/m ritual), I fully appreciate how academic discourse often forces the writer to respond
to one grand narrative with an opposing Truth claim. See C.N. Kendall, "'Real Dominant, Real
Fun!': Gay Male Pornography and the Pursuit of Masculinity" (1993) 57 Sask. L. Rev. 21.
67. Supra note I at 101.
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workers. 68 Cossman rightly recognizes that "morality" is inherent in the
way in which the law confronts sexuality, but her argument is that we need
to construct a new sexual morality centred upon respect and consent.69
Some have argued that queer theory too readily embraces liberal prin-
ciples of consent as the basis for an agenda of social change .7 But
Cossman's point is that within heteronormative legal discourse, queer
consent is ignored, disbelieved and, if recognized, it is assumed to
intensify the human degradation of "bad sex." While consent may be
foundational to liberal theory, legal liberalism has failed to take consent
seriously when it comes to queer sexualities.
The authors also call for a reinvigoration of coalition politics around
queer sex issues. Becki Ross is most explicit in her advocacy of this
agenda:
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and friends need to pursue alliances with all
communities who have experienced histories of intimidation -for ex-
ample, coalitions amongst Black, Asian, and First Nation communities
and communities of sex-trade workers, the disabled, and AIDS activists.
Ambitiously, we need to persuade queers and queer-positive supporters
that state sexual regulation has an impact on all of our sexualities, not just
on those of perverts.'
However, I fear that this call for the ongoing construction of a "chain of
equivalence"72 between social groups which have experienced intimida-
tion will be very difficult to achieve. It is hardly surprising that many
communities of colour are reluctant to embrace a queer agenda, and many
lesbians and gays of colour experience alienation from their communities
(matched by their experience of alienation from racially coded lesbian
and gay subcultures). 73 In part, this is explainable by the way in which
dominant culture demands "respectability" of "minority" groups, as a
prerequisite to the (unfulfilled) promise of social acceptance. Construct-
ing alliances, while a noble aim, is no easy task.
68. Ibid. at 44. I have made a similar argument in Stychin, supra note 66 at 74.
69. Supra note t at 144.
70. See, e.g., S. Burgess, "Book Review: Law's Desire: Sexuality and the Limits of Justice"
(supra note 66) (1997) 7 Law & Pol. Bk. Rev. 183 at 185 [online publication].
71. Supra note 1 at 192.
72. E. Laclau & C. Mouffe, Hegemony & Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, 1985) 144.
73. See, e.g., C. Petersen, "Envisioning a Lesbian Equality Jurisprudence" in D. Herman &
C. Stychin, eds., Legal Inversions: Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Politics of Law (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1995) 118; M. Eaton, "Homosexual Unmodified: Speculations on
Law's Discourse, Race, and the Construction of Sexual Identity" in Herman & Stychin, eds.,
ibid. at 46; G. Conerly, "The Politics of Black Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Identity" in B.
Beemyn & M. Eliason,eds., Queer Studies (New York: New York University Press, 1996) 133.
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Moreover, the yearning for mainstream respectability ensures that the
goal of unity within gay and lesbian communities around state censorship
will be equally difficult to realize. As the authors acknowledge, anti-porn
feminist theory has many proponents in positions of relative power,
including within the lesbian legal academic community.74 Furthermore,
for many lesbians and gays, mainstream respectability seems increas-
ingly attainable in contemporary Canada (provided that they respect the
public/private distinction, as it is constituted by the heterosexual order).
The granting of Charter equality rights on the basis of "sexual orienta-
tion," in combination with statutory human rights guarantees (however
narrowly they may be defined), is implicitly premised on the normaliza-
tion of lesbians and gays, and this is increasingly embraced within sexual
identity politics. Rather than standing up for a radical sex politics, many
lesbians (and many more gay men) seem "wedded" (pun very much
intended) to a conservative, normalizing, "vanilla" agenda, in which
distance is maintained between "good gays" and queer outlaws who seek
to pervert the public sphere.75 As Shannon Bell perceptively describes,
the need to construct an "other" is ever present amongst gays and
lesbians: "identity/difference is duplicated inside the category homo-
sexual to produce an internal dichotomy: virtuous homosexual/per-
vert. '7 6 Becki Ross experienced this dichotomy during the Bad Attitude
trial. The Crown Counsel strategically separated the "lesbian commu-
nity" (holders of rights) from the readers of Bad Attitude, who were
constituted as part of an s/m community ("whose rights are, thankfully,
not protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms")." I
suspect that many gay men and lesbians would wholeheartedly concur
with his assessment.
At the same time, one welcome impact of the current climate of
censorship is an increasingly strong bond between some lesbians and gay
men, especially within s/m communities. As both find themselves
74. See, e.g., A. Scales, "Avoiding Constitutional Depression: Bad Attitudes and the Fate of
Butler" (1994) 7 Can. J. of Women & Law 349; R. Auchmuty, "Last in, First Out: Lesbian and
Gay Legal Studies" (1997) 5 Feminist Legal Studies 235 at 248-252.
75. See, e.g., M. Kirk & H. Madsen, After the Ball: How America Will Conquer Its Fear and
Hatred of Gays in the '90s (New York: Penguin, 1989); B. Bawer, A Place at the Table: The
Gay Individual in American Society (New York: Poseidon Press, 1993); A. Sullivan, Virtually
Normal (New York: Picador, 1995).
76. Supra note I at 205. See also R. Robson, "Resisting the Family: Repositioning Lesbians
in Legal Theory" (1994) 19 Signs 975. This issue is the frequent subject of heated debate in the
lesbian and gay communities; see C. Crain, "Pleasure Principles" Lingua Franca (October
1997) 26. Of course, it might well be argued that sex radicals engage in the "othering" of the
"good gays."
77. Supra note I at 175.
The Politics Of The Perverse
marginalized, especially by 61ites within the lesbian and gay movements,
these queers have discovered that they have more in common than they
previously thought. In this regard, new alliances serve to resist a lesbian
separatist politics, as well as some gay male attempts at incorporation
within the patriarchal system.7 It might be argued that this alliance should
extend beyond same-sex queers, to embrace perversion amongst the
heterosexually identified. 9 This may be an important dimension to a
politics of perversion, although it too has its limitations. On the one hand,
many cross-gender perverts now find their spaces subjected to intense
regulation, at least in the United Kingdom, in a way which closely
resembles the ongoing surveillance of other queer spaces.80 But, on the
other, the specificity of same-gender queer practices also must be
considered. As Elizabeth Wilson argues, cross-gender perversion is
sometimes (but certainly not always) read within dominant culture, not
as a dangerous sexuality out of control, but as harmless kinkiness.8 '
Provided that the public/private dichotomy is respected, consensual
cross-gender sexuality between (two) adults is constructed rather differ-
ently than same-sex perversion.8 2
Although all of these alliances are important and should be fostered,
I read the agenda offered in Bad Attitude/s on Trial as centred on the
disruption of the public/private dichotomy; a strategy which has been
advanced by other queer theorists .83 For many, the new closet is inhabited
78. See generally P.L. Duncan,"Identity,Power, and Difference: Negotiating Conflict in an
S/M Dyke Community" in Beemyn & Eliason, supra note 73 at 87.
79. The identity categories lesbian, gay, bisexual, and straight can come to be rendered
increasingly unstable and contradictory when the focus is on s/m. I would argue that part of its
importance as a site of resistance to heteronormativity is the potential of s/m, in some moments,
to resist the constraints of these categories; i.e. to queer them. My use of the term "perversion,"
in this context, refers to sexual acts (as opposed to identities) which are socially constructed
within heteronormative culture as outside the bounds of respectability. While same-sex sexual
activity historically has been interpreted within dominant culture as perverse, my argument
here is that the relationship between acts, identities, social respectability, and perversion,
arguably is becoming increasingly ambiguous.
80. See T. Hoople, "Conflicting Visions: SM, Feminism, and the Law. A Problem of
Representation" (1996) 11 Can. J. L. & Soc. 177 at 189-190, fn. 36.
81. E. Wilson, "Is Transgression Transgressive?" in J. Bristow & A.R. Wilson, eds.,
Activating Theory: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Politics (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1993) 107
at 113.
82. On the construction of gay male sadomasochism, see Stychin, supra note 66 at 117-139
(analyzing the reasoning of the House of Lords in the gay male s/m case of R. v. Brown, [ 1993]
2 W.L.R. 556). By contrast, see the Court of Appeal's treatment of extreme heterosexual s/m
between a married couple: R. v. Wilson, [1996] 3 W.L.R. 125.
83. See, e.g., L. Berlant & E. Freeman, "Queer Nationality" in M. Warner, ed., Fear of a
Queer Planet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993) 193.
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by the perverts in the gay and lesbian communities; and while a darkroom
can be a highly pleasurable space, it is nice to have the option to "come
out" within the broader community. But acceptance there, let alone
within dominant culture, is hard to find. One of the great ironies of
feminist anti-porn discourse is its insistence (chanted like a mantra) that
lesbians and gays who practice s/m are simply appropriating the values
of masculinity and patriarchy.84 But queer s/m'ers find that
heteropatriarchal culture, far from embracing them as new recruits, is
ready to bash verbally and physically at the sight of leather and a crewcut.
As the authors convincingly argue, those attitudes are understandable
because of the contradictory relationship between queer s/m practices,
and the codes of masculinity and femininity. The cultural appropriation
of those codes does not signify their unthinking adoption, but serves to
problematize the construction of fixed and static gender roles within a
heteronormative order.
Legal discourse never achieves total closure. The spaces, gaps, and
contradictions are always open to exploitation by queers on the street, in
"performance," in the courts, and in the academy. Bad Attitude/s on Trial
is one act of resistance. It is a major contribution and undoubtedly will
prove to be a central text on the contested terrain of pornography. It should
be read by everyone with an interest in freedom of expression, queer
politics, and feminist theory.
84. See, e.g., Scales, supra note 74; Kendall, supra note 66. For a forceful critique of this
feminist anti-s/m argument, see Hoople, supra note 80.




